



Class j)c T I f* 
Book / ty 
GuyrightU? 



cofwigiit deposit 



WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR 



The PiiiLOSoriiY of Conduct (in preparation) 
Pointers to the Wise Life (in preparation) 

These books, shortly to be published, present in a 
different way and develop the matters treated of in 
MENTOR. For this reason, they are as a complement 
of Mentor. But, although they would be advan- 
tageously used in connection with Mentor, they are 
in themselves independent books. 



MENTOR 



BY 



LEO PHILBERT 




BROADWAY PUBLISHING CO. 

8S5 Broadway, New York 



BRANCH OFFICES: 
INDIANAPOLIS, 



WASHINGTON, 
NORFOLK, 



BALTIMORE 
DES MOINES, IOWA 



P4- 



COPYRIGHT, 1912, 

BY 

BROADWAY PUBLISHING COMPANY. 



6CIA312369 



PREFACE 

The subject of which this book treats deserves 
the consideration of the thoughtful mind for its 
practical usefulness. The matters have been pre- 
sented in a systematic way, and, it is hoped, with 
precision and clearness. It has been the aim to 
make of this book a guide in life, an adviser: hence 
the title Mentor. The book is addressed to the 
student, but also to the general public. It is pub- 
lished with the wish that its perusal may prove as 
beneficial to the reader as the writing of it has been 
found useful to Leo Philbert. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I How best to attain to knowledge 7 

II Application of the rules of the art of 
thinking to the operation of the intel- 
lect about certain objects of knowl- 
edge 1 — 8 

III Examination into the operation of the 

intellect with rules for guidance in 
its operation, and practical remarks 
about a part thereof , , 15 

IV How to read in order to derive knowl- 

edge from what is read. ..... .1 19 

V How to impart to others the knowledge 

acquired . .... . , 22 

VI Relative usefulness of the objects of 

knowledge . 24 

VII Discipline towards conduct ...... 31 

VIII The philosophy of life .... ., 34 



MENTOR 



HOW BEST TO ATTAIN TO KNOWLEDGE 

Surrounded by objects which force themselves 
upon our consideration, and with which we are in 
a necessary relation, we naturally endeavor to 
know those objects. It is, therefore, important that 
we should be acquainted with the way which may 
best lead us to the attainment of that knowledge: 
this way lies in the proper handling of the faculty 
through whose operation we arrive at knowledge — 
the thinking faculty, called intellect or reason. This 
proper handling of the intellect comes from train- 
ing; for the intellect is like a sense or a limb amen- 
able to training. This training is imparted by rules 
formulated from man's experience. By these rules, 
thinking has been raised to an art. 

Enter upon the surest way to knowledge by 
studying the art of thinking, and learning its rules. 

7 



II 

APPLICATION OF Tin: RULES OF THE ART OF THINK- 
ING TO THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT 
ABOUT CERTAIN OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE 

Is that whkh you purpose to know, the possi- 
bility of a thing? Attend to the following rules. 

That a thing be possible, it must not be so out of 

the ordinary course of events as to oppose com- 
mon sense; the terms by which the thing is defined 
must not be contradictory; if the thing is contrary 
to laws of nature, either it should appear that these 
laws are neutralized by others, or there should be 
a reasonable ground for thinking that the thing is 
due to laws which we do not know, or to the in- 
teraction of the several laws which we know. 

Is that which you purpose to know the existence 
of a thing? Attend to the following rules. That 
a thing exists is founded on the testimony either of 
self or of others. Now, the testimony of self is 
derived from the impression an object makes on 
our senses. See if your senses are, owing to nor- 
mal condition, qualified for being correctly im- 
pressed by objects, in order that from the impres- 
sion received you may safely infer the existence of 
the object which produces the impression. More- 
over, given that your senses are in such condition 
as to report correctly about objects, see that your 
mind itself is not hindered by preoccupation from 

8 



Mentor 



interpreting correctly their report: a preoccupied 
mind is liable to perceive not what the senses report 
but what itself under preoccupation creates; in this 
case sensation is had of an unreal object — the ob- 
ject as presented by sensation does not exist. More- 
over, when needed, bring to bear upon the object 
of whose presence you are informed by one sense 
the action of other senses in order that through the 
comparison between the several reports of the vari- 
ous senses the report of that sense being either con- 
firmed or corrected, you may conclude to the ex- 
istence either of the object as apprehended by that 
sense, or of a different object as subsequently made 
out under the intervening action of the other senses. 
When the object does not fall under the senses, 
the way to establish its existence is through the re- 
lation of dependence in which it stands to another 
object of whose existence the senses have made us 
cognizant. Now, that we may conclude to the ex- 
istence of an object, phenomenon, event, from its 
relation of dependence to another, this relation of 
dependence must be a fact. But as we know two 
objects, phenomena, events to be in a relation of de- 
pendence only from their being found together or 
following each other, the point to be determined is 
whether coexistence or succession arise from their 
interdependence or not. Now, coexistence or suc- 
cession are known to arise from the interdependence 
of two objects, phenomena, events when from ade- 
quate observation and experience it has become es- 
tablished that the two objects, phenomena, events 
are always found together or follow each other 



CQcntot 



cither as Cause an<l effect. Or as CO-effecta of one 

common cause. Thus, from the fart thai constant 
observation and experience teach the coexistence or 
succession of two objects, phenomena, events, you 

may conclude to a relation of dependence between 

them, and by reason of this dependence, you may 
from the existence of the one which falls under 
the senses infer the existence of the other which 
is removed from the senses. 

A certain conduct of others is a fact or event, the 
existence of which like that of any other object may 
be ground for inquiry. To ascertain the existence 
of that conduct, consider whether there is between 
that conduct and that from which it is assumed to 
proceed relation of dependence as of effect to its 
cause. That from which conduct follows consists 
of the qualifications of the person and of the cir- 
cumstances of the case in which the person is 
placed. That a relation of dependence between a 
given conduct and a person possessed of certain 
qualifications and placed in certain circumstances 
does exist, may be concluded to from the fact that 
coexistence and succession have been observed be- 
tween that conduct and the person possessed of 
those qualifications when placed in those circum- 
stances. But the question is whether the person 
placed in those circumstances has precisely the 
qualifications which joined to the circumstances go 
to make the cause from which the conduct results. 
From the fact that because I have those qualifica- 
tions I would, in those circumstances have that con- 
duct I cannot conclude that that person in those cir- 

10 



Mentor 

cumstances would have that conduct too ; in so do- 
ing I would attribute my own conduct to another 
whom I see placed in those circumstances as if he had 
my qualifications, and this is precisely the question — 
whether his qualifications are exactly like mine. 
And supposing they were, are the circumstances in 
which he is placed such as I think they are ? Since 
the circumstances are one of the two elements 
which go to make the cause of conduct, a difference 
of quality in this ingredient will bring a difference 
of quality in the compound, and a qualitatively dif- 
ferent conduct will be the result. Therefore, on 
one hand the qualifications and on the other hand 
the case, of the person the existence of whose con- 
duct I seek to make out must be the same as mine 
in order that from my conduct I may conclude to 
the conduct of that person. Supposing it were 
found that the qualifications of the person are dif- 
ferent from mine, and in consequence that he must 
look at things differently, feel differently, and 
therefore act differently, then I would have to di- 
vest myself of my own qualifications and adapt his 
in order that I might know how he would act in 
given circumstances from the w r ay I myself would 
act were I in his place. But how can another's 
qualifications be made out for what they really are ? 
And given they could, how can I divest myself of 
mine to put on his ? Hence the extreme caution we 
must use in concluding to the conduct of others; 
the conclusion can never be absolute. 

That an object, phenomenon, event exists, is 
founded, besides the testimony of self, on the tes- 

II 



Odcntot 



timony of others. The testimony of others is re- 
sorted to either for confirmation of the testimony 
of self or for taking its place when the testimony 

of self cannot he had owing to distance, either in 
place or in lime, from the object, phenomenon, 
event The testimony of others with respect to the 
distance in place is in the form of relations of 
travel, newspapers, etc ; with respect to the distance 
in time, it is in the form of history. Now, the 
credibility of the testimony of others depends on 
their being qualified for knowing the existence of 
the object, phenomenon, event, and on their hav- 
ing no intention either from passion or interest to 
tell different from what they know; not to be de- 
ceived and not to deceive are the two grounds of 
credibility. The existence of an object, phe- 
nomenon, event which others refer they may know 
of either on the testimony of self, or themselves on 
the testimony of others. That they might not be 
deceived on the testimony of self, have they con- 
formed to the rules which guide the testimony of 
self? That they might not be deceived on the tes- 
timony of others have they put this testimony to the 
test of credibility? One might not allow himself 
to be deceived about what he is personally a witness 
of, and allow himself to be deceived on the testi- 
mony of another who has been that witness owing 
to the fact that that witness has been deceived or 
is deceiving. 

Is that which you purpose to know the nature of 
a thing? Attend to the following rules. The na- 
ture of things is knowable up to a certain point; 

12 



spentor 



beyond that point it is unknowable as shown by the 
futility of the efforts of self and of others to pass 
over that point. As the things we seek to know are 
of different orders or kinds, different shall be the 
method employed for attaining to the knowledge 
of them respectively. If the thing is to be per- 
ceived by the faculty of feeling, feeling alone is to 
be applied to it. If it is to be perceived by feel- 
ing conjointly with reason, both feeling and rea- 
son are to be applied in the measure corresponding 
to each. If feeling here is not a factor of knowl- 
edge it must not take part in the process by which 
the knowledge of the thing is arrived at. To al- 
low feeling to meddle with the operation of reason 
to which the working out of that knowledge per- 
tains is to cause the operation of reason to be hin- 
dered in proportion to the measure of the inter- 
ference; on account of this hindrance, the result of 
the operation will be different from what it would 
have been had not the hindrance occurred ; in other 
words, the knowledge of the thing shall be differ- 
ent according as feeling is kept out of or admitted 
conjointly with reason into, the operation: for a 
change has taken place not in the thing itself but in 
the perceptive agent who in the first case perceived 
the thing only by reason, whereas in the second by 
feeling besides. The feeling arises from an impres- 
sion made by the thing itself or by circumstances, 
the impression causing attraction towards or re- 
pulsion from, the thing : in this attraction or repul- 
sion the feeling (also called passion) consists. The 
circumstances may be state of health, atmospheric 

13 



e^cntor 



condition, age, social position, interest in or sym- 
pathy for, others, etc To attempt to get at the 
knowledge of the thing when under an impression 
from any of these sources is to become liable to 
give to feeling admittance into the operation which 
pertains to reason alone. Enter upon the pr< 
when not under an impression, either before it is 
received or after it is passed. When made out- 
side of interference on the part of feeling, the 
process of reason will lead you to the knowledge of 
the thing — to a true notion, idea, of it. Having 
thus acquired the knowledge of the thing, hence- 
forth guide yourself — even when under an impres- 
sion to the contrary — by your opinion of it, as de- 
rived from and based on, that knowledge. You will 
then act in accordance to what the thing is, not to 
what it is assumed to be. In the first case your 
conduct from its responding to a true idea of the 
thing will be right; in the second, from its respond- 
ing to an erroneous idea, it will be wrong. 

These rules obtain especially with regard to the 
knowledge of the end which one proposes to him- 
self, and of the means by wdiich he may compass 
that end. Feeling may suggest the end, and move 
towards making a more effective use of the means 
conducive to its attainment, but the process of de- 
termining and knowing the end and the means to 
the end pertains to reason alone. Here, however, 
more than anywhere else, feeling is more apt to 
interfere with reason, causing misapprehension and 
error — the more detrimental, the more practical is 
the knowledge involved. 



14 



Ill 



EXAMINATION INTO THE OPERATION OF THE INTEL- 
LECT WITH RULES FOR GUIDANCE IN ITS OPERA- 
TION, AND PRACTICAL REMARKS ABOUT A PART 
THEREOF 

The operation by which the intellect searches after 
knowledge consists of observation and experiment, 
and, on the facts furnished by these, of reasoning 
either by induction or deduction for the drawing of 
a conclusion. 

The difference between observation and experi- 
ment is that in observation the object of knowledge 
is naturally placed under the operation of the in- 
tellect ; in experiment it is so placed by man's inter- 
ference: this artificial bringing of objects for ex- 
perimentation leads to a knowledge which might 
not otherwise be arrived at, the occasion for obser- 
vation being wanting. 

Once the object is known, in this knowledge a 
fact or truth has been acquired. Upon the truths 
acquired from observation and experiment the in- 
tellect operates through reasoning for the drawing 
of a conclusion which will convey a further truth. 
In reasoning, therefore, the intellect proceeds from 
that which it knows to that which it purposes to 
know. When from the truth about particular ob- 
jects it concludes to a general truth, the reasoning 
is by induction; when from a general truth it con- 



Qdtntot 

eludes to the truth about a particular object, the 
reasoning is by deduction. Of the truths the state- 
ment of which f<»rnis the propositions which as 
premises in syllogism (the form of the reasoning 
by deduction) j are the ground for deduction) one, 
the predicate of the middle term, was acquired 
through induction; the other — the belonging 
the subject to the middle term as a member to a 
class — through observation and experiment. 

In order that the process of reasoning may be 
carried out correctly, attend to the following rules. 
Since in the reasoning by induction the inference 
is made from the truth about particular objects to 
a general truth, in order that the thing inferred or 
the generalization may be true, take care that the 
inference is warranted by a sufficient number of 
facts ; that no claim is made which the facts do not 
justify; that the facts are interpreted for what they 
really are. If the facts on which the generaliza- 
tion rests are too few, or if, among the many facts 
adduced, some are only assumed, then the generali- 
zation is not well established, and an inference can- 
not safely be drawn. And since in the reasoning 
by deduction or syllogism the inference is made 
from the relation in which both the predicate and 
the subject are known to stand to the middle term 
or class to that which must exist between the sub- 
ject and the predicate, take care that the subject 
and the predicate are compared severally with the 
same middle term or class. 

The following remarks about syllogism will help 

16 



'•■; cpetttot 

towards a clearer understanding of this part of the 
operation of the intellect and of its relation to 
knowledge. 

Since the conclusion that subject and predicate 
agree with each other is based on the fact that it 
has been found that the predicate and the subject 
severally agree with the middle term or class, syl- 
logism is not for invention, but for drawing infer- 
ences from invention : the only thing it may lay a 
claim to is that it makes explicitly known in the 
conclusion what was implicitly known in the prem- 
ises. It does not discover a new truth ; it simply 
presents in a clear light the truth already acquired 
but felt rather than seen. Hence the use of syllog- 
ism is not for the acquisition of truth but for the 
presentation to self or others of the truth acquired. 
Do you wish to gain a clearer knowledge of your 
statements or of the statements of others? Use 
with regard to them syllogistic reasoning con- 
sciously after having used it unconsciously; 
go over the ground reflectively after hav- 
ing covered it instinctively. For syllogistic reason- 
ing is an unconscious, instinctive operation of the 
intellect rooted in its very nature — an operation 
which is the same as to kind in all men, and dif- 
ferent only as to degree in each individual accord- 
ing to the native power of his intellect and the 
effectiveness exercise and training have imparted 
to it. 

Besides presenting with clearness the truth, syl- 
logism procures to the intellect exercise in the rea- 

17 



Odtntot 

Boning operation, an exercise of such virtue that 

whosoever be desirous of having his reasoning pow- 
ers at their best cannot afford to neglect the study 
and cultivation of syllogism. 



iS 



IV 



HOW TO READ IN ORDER TO DERIVE KNOWLEDGE 
FROM WHAT IS READ 

In language, knowledge is stored up. The words 
of which language is made of are embodied ideas; 
and by means of these ideas are presented to the 
imagination a concrete object whether single or 
composite — an image, and to the intellect a con- 
cept whether single or made up of subordinate con- 
cepts — a thought. The image is conveyed in de- 
scription and narration; the thought in statement. 
In your reading you must start with a perception 
of the ideas expressed by the words — an under- 
standing of the meaning of the words used. To 
discover the meaning of a new word is to acquire 
a new idea, and to that extent to enlarge one's 
knowledge. But to become acquainted with the 
meaning of a new word does more than to enlarge 
one's knowledge through the acquisition of the 
idea it expresses ; it also enables one to fully grasp 
either the image or the thought which the word 
contributes to present ; from the fact that the mean- 
ing of a word is ignored the image will be blurred 
and the thought obscured. 

Assuming that the meaning of all the words used 
for presenting either an image or a thought is 
known, the method to be employed for obtaining 
a correct perception of either the image or the 

19 



C^cntor 



thought and through them of the feeling which they 
arc calculated to produce will he as follows: And 
first let your mind he entirely occupied in the image 
of the thing described or narrated, or in the thought 

stated: attention is a prerequisite for further proc- 
ess. Then, as t<> the image: according as the 
image is single or composite the apprehension will 
be of it simply or of its component parts simultane- 
ously : as to the thought: according as the thought 
is single or made up of subordinate thoughts in 
the relation of parts to a whole, the apprehension 
likewise will be of it simply or of its component 
parts in the relation they hold one to another, and 
all to the main thought they concur to form, simul- 
taneously. 

Once you have apprehended the image or the 
thought as presented to you, and experienced the 
feeling they give rise to, consider whether the 
image or the thought is, with regard to 
its object, true; and given it is found to be true, 
consider whether it is rightly presented in itself or 
in relation with the feeling it was meant to cause, 
or whether there is not a better way of presenting 
it. For a writer perceives and expresses his per- 
ceptions only as far as he is able, and his ability 
is dependent on his mental power as to perceiving 
and as to expressing what he has perceived, into 
which enters his command of the language which 
he uses as his instrument of expression. His reader 
from being better qualified for perceiving or ex- 
pressing might perceive and express better than he 
does. Be the case what it may with you, once 

20 



Spentot 



you have grasped the image or the thought of the 
writer, abstract it from the words in which he ex- 
presses it, the form in which he presents it, and 
study it thus in itself; once you have mastered it, 
express it in your own words, and present it to 
yourself in the form you yourself give to it. Then 
you will have made it your own; you will have as- 
similated it. And of what you read only that which 
you assimilate is truly food for your mind. Then 
compare it with that which you already knew on 
the subject to determine whether it is a new truth 
or only the truth that you knew under a different 
guise, or viewed from a different standpoint ; in the 
latter case, that which you know will gain in ex- 
tension and clearness ; in the former, you will have 
added to your store of knowledge. 



21 



V 

HOW TO IMPART TO OTHERS THE KNOWLEDGE 
ACQUIRED 

Since knowledge is presented through language, 
fir^t you must use the words best calculated to ex- 
press your ideas from among those with which your 
hearer or reader is supposed to be acquainted In 

these words shall be presented the object of knowl- 
edge to that of the faculties — whether imagina- 
tion or feeling or intellect — by which from its na- 
ture, it is to be perceived. The presentation is to 
be made according as the perception is had ; in other 
words, the process by which the perception of the 
object is effected must be followed in the presenta- 
tion of the object for perception. An image you 
present according as the object itself impressed it 
on your mind; and if, in presenting it, your pur- 
pose be not so much to give a mental view of the 
object as to produce in the hearer or reader the 
feeling which, in presence of the object, you have 
yourself experienced, in the image shall be deli- 
neated those features of the object which awak- 
ened in you that feeling. A thought you present 
according as it has been elaborated through the 
thinking process. 

But the presentation of an image — be it for the 
purpose of affording simply a mental view of the 
object, or of causing the feeling the object arouses — 

22 






cpentot 

and of a thought must be adapted to the perceptive 
power of the faculties concerned in the hearer or 
reader as resulting from the native build of his 
mind, and the capability or perception his mind has 
acquired through exercise and training. And in 
the case of a thought his disposition towards it 
must, moreover, be taken into account in order that 
the proper form in which to make the presentation 
be adopted. This disposition may be either simple 
ignorance, or disbelief or apathy. If simple ignor- 
ance, presentation will be made in the form of ex- 
position for instruction; if disbelief, of argumenta- 
tion for convincing; if apathy, of persuasion for 
moving to accept and act up to, what has been 
shown either through exposition or argumentation 
to be the truth. The instructing in exposition you 
impart by stating the thought; the convincing you 
effect by adducing the proofs which support the 
thought and refuting the reasons against it; the 
persuading by setting forth the considerations that 
influence the will for action — the reasonableness of 
adopting what one knows to be the truth, and of 
acting up to it, and on one hand the advantages to 
be derived, and on the other the detriment to be 
avoided, from so doing: that is, you employ with 
regard to others the same process you have made 
use of with regard to yourself as to knowing the 
truth, and, the truth once known, as to persuading 
yourself to embrace it and to act up to it. 



23 



VI 



RELATIVE USEFULNESS OF THE OBJECTS OF KNOWL- 

EDGE 

The usefulness of an object of knowledge is 
measured by the bearing it has upon man's wel- 
fare. Now, man's welfare is more directly and 
immediately connected with and dependent upon, 
the knowledge of health, of making a living, of 
morals and of the world in general. 

[s it not natural that the first object which must 
call man's attention for study should be himself — 
that individualized mass of matter or body in and 
through which the cosmic force operating consti- 
tutes a living being? The component parts of his 
body and the body as a whole — an organism or 
machine for the process of life; the conditions re- 
quired for this process to be carried on normally 
in the body, so that from the normal process a state 
of health ensue — disease being no other than an in- 
terference, from any cause, with the normal process 
of life, how interference from certain causes with 
the life process may be prevented and disease warded 
off, or disease having taken hold of the body how it 
may be removed, and, the normal process being re- 
established, health restored; how, the principal 
causes of interference with the process of life and 
consequently of disease being in the quality of the 
food eaten, of the water drunk, and of the air 

24 



gjentot 

breathed, to determine what must be the food, the 
water and the air that they may be conducive to 
and not destructive of, a normal process of life; 
when and under what conditions the reproductive 
functions may be performed so as to be not detri- 
mental but beneficial both to the two concurring in- 
dividuals and to their offspring, and how when born 
the child may be best reared, these and other points 
of the physical life present themselves first to your 
consideration for you to acquire of them the knowl- 
edge which their importance requires. 

The essential need of man as a living being is 
to furnish to his body materials by which its sub- 
stance worn out and eliminated in the process of 
life may be repaired. These materials are con- 
tained in the food in the two-fold form of solid 
and liquid. Covering and shelter and physiologi- 
cally accidental needs of the body dependent on cli- 
mate, but sociologically they have also become es- 
sential inasmuch in a civilized country man cannot, 
even if the climate should permit of it, live naked 
and houseless. These are therefore the means of 
subsistence which man has to provide for. The 
way in which they may be procured, and in that 
*vay how best the procuring of them may be ef- 
fected is the next object of knowledge. 

One might raise his food-stuff, make his cover- 
ing, build his shelter. But in civilized society where 
division of labor obtains it is more advantageous 
to limit one's self to one pursuit. If that pursuit 
be the raising or manufacturing of products, the 
products will be of one class, or, in that class, of 

25 



€0cntor 



cue kind; and the products one raises <»r manu- 
factures he will exchange with products raised or 
manufactured by others through tin* medium of 
change — money. First, then, know the class, and, 
in the class, the kind of products you are to raise 
or manufacture. This you determine by examining 
into the nature of the soil or the sources of supply 
of the raw material, the means of transportation, 
the demand, etc. Next, know how best to raise or 
manufacture your products, and finally how best to 
exchange them. The raising or manufacturing and 
exchanging of products is an art and art is founded 
on science. Be acquainted with the rules of the 
art, and the principles of the science on which the 
art rests. Instead of raising or manufacturing 
products, one may hire his services in the form of 
labor, trade, profession. What kind of labor, what 
trade or profession you are fit for, know from a 
consideration of your physical constitution, mental 
capacity, aptitude, talent, inclination. 

The making of a living in a society is subordin- 
ated to the economic conditions obtaining in that 
society: know how to make the best of those con- 
ditions. 

Learn to so supply your wants as to have some- 
thing left over after your wants have been satis- 
fied; and this residue learn to cause to produce by 
investing it wisely. There is an art of saving and 
an art of investing. And saving and investing what 
is saved is the road to competency and wealth. 

On being born, man finds himself member of a 
society — first, the family, and later the community, 

26 



Mentor 

made up of the several families as units. From the 
fact that he is member of a society his action is 
necessarily restricted by the action of the other 
members, as theirs by his. Without this restriction 
society could not exist. For the curtailing of his 
individual action man is amply conpensated by the 
advantages which society affords him in the se- 
curity against the encroachments of others, and in 
the help from the co-operation of others. Now, 
in the restriction of the action of the individual 
members of a society with regard one to another 
consist their respective duties and rights ; for where 
there is a duty for one there is a right for another ; 
right and duty are correlative. These rights and 
duties constitute morals. The determining of these 
rights and duties has been elaborated by the experi- 
ence of the race in its endeavors to adjust the rela- 
tions of men living in society so as to best secure 
the existence of society and its end — the welfare of 
its component members. Once effected, this deter- 
mining of rights and duties establishes a rule of 
conduct for all the members of the social body. 
This rule of conduct is set forth in maxims, cus- 
toms, laws. Here is, therefore, an object of knowl- 
edge for the man living in society — his rights from 
others, his duties to others. To arrive at that 
knowledge he has to study the rules of conduct as 
set forth in the maxims, customs and laws and apply 
them to the cases they cover, and as to those they 
do not, to take guidance from them. This is the 
work of the intellect: from the rule of conduct the 
intellect makes out the rights and the duties accord- 

27 



C&cntov 

ing to the relation he stands to others. The mental 

state of one who lias arrived at this knowledge is 

conscience. Since the requisite for one to do his 
duty to Others IS to be aware of that duty, you 
may see how important it is for men living in so- 
ciety to know their respective rights and duties with 
that habitual knowledge which make- one read] 
action when called upon to act — that knowledge 
which is had in conscience. 

1 [ow to live in conformity to the laws of the phy- 
sical life for bodily welfare; how to procure the 
means of subsistence according to the economic 
conditions of the community in which one is placed; 
how to act up to the requirements of the social 
life in order that the society be maintained and 
fulfil its end — the welfare of its component mem- 
. these are practical objects which every man 
is bound to know to a greater or lesser extent un- 
der pain of dropping out of the race of life. There 
is another knowledge more speculative, but which 
on certain points mingles with the practical. As the 
three preceding knowledges are of man as a being 
that lives, struggles for existence and moves in so- 
ciety, so the present is of man as a philosopher who 
endeavors to know things irrespective of the bear- 
ing they have on his welfare, outside of the satis- 
faction of solving the questions of an inquisitive 
mind and of discovering the truth about things. It 
is by seeking after this knowledge that man par- 
ticularly shows himself a rational being, occupy- 
ing a higher plane of mentality than the rest of the 
living beings. For living beings up the scale of 

28 



Cpentor 



life have knowledge of what the requirements of 
the physical life are, of how to procure the means 
of subsistence, and — in the case of many — of how 
to live together for mutual protection and help, but 
man raises himself above them by considering things 
in their nature, their relation, their phenomena, 
with a view of knowing them for what they are, 
and thus of arriving at the reason of things. This 
philosopher's search after knowledge is indulged in 
only by a few. As used to the sun and the starry 
heavens, to the succession of night and day and of 
the seasons we seldom stop to consider what they 
teach us, in like manner used as we are to the con- 
tact with our fellow men in business pursuits, so- 
cial duties and pleasures, we do not ask ourselves 
what man is, what society is, what civilization is, 
how man came to be what he is to-day. We are 
too engrossed by occupation to rise to this philoso- 
phical disquisition, we fail to realize its worth, we 
are more fond of being amused than instructed. 
But you, if it be not your profession to pursue this 
study, devote at least some of your leisure to it. In 
this study you have helpers : scientists discover laws 
of nature, savants unearth facts: they work for 
you; they furnish you materials for you to work 
upon along this line of study. In the intellectual 
as in the material field, division of labor obtains, 
making for progress toward a larger truth. Erudi- 
tion is but the means of a philosopher's knowledge. 
Of little use is erudition alone if it leads not to that 
knowledge. Of what use are, for instance, dates, 
places, events of history, if not connected with so- 

29 



ODcntor 



ciety, its state, civilization, and this for making 
out human nature as revealed by its action? What 
nobler use can man make (if his intellect than in 
getting at the reason of things? And what higher 
enjoyment can he pretend to than that derived from 
the possession of such a knowledge? This was the 
enjoyment the Roman poet longed after: Felix qui 

potuit rerum cognoscere causas* 

* Happy he who can discover the reason of 
things. — / r irgU. 



3° 



yn 

DISCIPLINE TOWARDS CONDUCT 

Acted upon by the surrounding 1 objects, and 
moved by the passions which the impression made 
by the objects has aroused, keep the passions within 
the bounds of their office. This office is to awaken 
reason to the consideration of the object which 
makes the impression, and to be subservient to rea- 
son in the line of action which reason may deter- 
mine upon with regard to the object. 

The passions which the impression from an ob- 
ject arouses are either desire which moves toward 
the object, or fear which moves away from it. 
Awakened by the passions, reason proceeds to con- 
sider whether really the object is to be desired or 
feared. If found not to be desired or feared, rea- 
son warns the passions to cease and "be still," there 
being no cause for their exercise; if found to be 
desired or feared, reason determines whether it may 
be attained or removed, or not ; in the first case rea- 
son bids the passions to lend their aid toward its 
attainment or removal; in the second, it enjoins 
upon the passions to desist from acting, and calls 
fortitude into exercise for the foregoing of the 
unattainable enjoyment or for the suffering of the 
unavoidable hurt — the enjoyment being perhaps un- 
attainable simply from its being forbidden ; the hurt 

31 



e^entor 



unavoidable simply from its being connected with 
an imperative duty. 

Not only from a present object through the 
senses, but also from an absent object through 
memory and imagination the impression that 
arouses the passions of desire or fear is made. And 
not only a concrete but also an abstract object may 
cause that impression, the impression here coming 
through the intellect that has discovered that the 
abstract object is to be desired or feared. Desire 
or fear of an abstract object presented by the in- 
tellect may operate as a motive for or a deterrent 
from, certain acts. One will be moved to do an 
act by the attraction of the beauty the act reveals, 
or by the desire of the advantages it procures; and 
he will be deterred from doing an act by the re- 
pulsion its ugliness causes, and by the fear of the 
detriment it entails. Attractive beauty and repul- 
sive ugliness on one hand, and on the other advan- 
tage to be gained or detriment to be avoided, are 
abstract objects which the intellect presents for 
moving to or deterring from, doing certain acts 
according as those acts have either beauty or ugli- 
ness, and bring about either advantage or detri- 
ment. Take the case of morals. The beauty of 
right or the ugliness of wrong, and the advantage 
or detriment found in doing right or wrong from 
the exercise about it of the self, social and religious 
sanctions in the form of approbation or censure 
with the concomitant effective reward or punish- 
ment, respectively move to do what is right and de- 
ter from doing what is wrong. 



G&zntat 



Discriminate the elements that enter into the 
process of human conduct, allow each to play the 
part assigned to it by nature, and to play it in the 
order nature has determined, and derive guidance 
and help for action from the motives presented to 
you by the intellect; this is the discipline towards 
conduct ; embrace it. This discipline man must have 
if he wants his conduct to be rational. Without this 
discipline man is moved hither and thither under 
the impulse of ungoverned passions as the waves of 
the sea, but with it, he remains firm "as rocks resist 
the billows and the sky."* 



* Goldsmith. 



33 



VIII 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 

Man is one of the innumerable forms which be- 
came individualize* 1 porti the universal sub- 
stance from their being independent centres of en- 
c Forms exist only for a time; they are 
like bubbles on the ocean of matter. And in the 
brief period of their existence they continually 
change because they are continually in motion: they 
go through the cycles through which all individual- 
ized mass of matter — be it star or organic body — 
passes — the cycles of birth, youth, maturity, decrep- 
itude and death. In death the centre of em 
is destroyed: the personal existence of the indi- 
vidual vanishes; but the elements of its body liber- 
ated by the cessation of the centre of energy return 
to the universal substance, thence to be drawn to 
enter into another individualized form as its com- 
ponents. 

On coming into existence as a human individual 
you are ruled by this law of matter. Do not rebel 
against it, but rather make the best of the cycle 
through which you are passing. Each cycle has 
own advantages and charms though different from 
those of the preceding or succeeding cycle, as are 
different the advantages and charms of the various 
seasons in the year. 

Since you are but one of the numberless individ- 

34 



epetttor 



ualized forms which make up the world, study your- 
self in connection with them, and particularly with 
those to whom you are more closely allied by rea- 
son of a greater similarity of nature: thus will you 
be better enabled to know what behavior comports 
with what you are. This behavior is to conform 
to the laws by which are governed, according to 
their respective nature, all the forms into which 
portions of the universal substance became, from 
having their own centre of energy, individualized. 
By these laws man is governed as to his physical, 
mental, moral, social and religious life. The con- 
formity to these laws for man consists in acquies- 
cing in their operation, however he may have to 
suffer from it; and in doing what they require, 
however hard the doing may be. On this two- fold 
conformity to these laws depends your happiness; 
do not look for real happiness outside of the order 
established by these laws. And within this order, 
take care that you do not mar the happiness coming 
to you by regrets about the past, fears about the 
future, desires of to you unattainable objects. Re- 
grets may be for mistakes made or for pleasures 
gone; regrets will not rectify the mistakes nor 
bring the pleasures back. Fears may be of possible 
evils or of certain death : fears will not remove evils 
that are to come, and evils are feared which will 
never come; and as to death, supposing it to be 
feared, will your fear of it lessen the certainty of 
it? But is death to be feared? Death is but a 
natural event; it is in the plan of nature; it is, like 
birth, an act — the closing act — of the drama of life : 

35 



03cntor 

death in itself is not to be Feared. Therefore, both 
by regrets about the past and fears about the fu- 
ture you detract without cause from the happiness 
you would Otherwise enjoy. And likewise do you 
detract from your happiness by a desire of that 
which is to you unattainable. An ungratified de- 
sire is a source of pain. Divert your mind from the 
object which for being unattainable dooms the de- 
sire which it awakens to remain ungratified: priva- 
tion is not felt when not known. 

Besides securing the essential happiness in con- 
forming to nature's laws as to the physical, men- 
tal, moral, social and religious life, and taking care 
not to mar this happiness by sterile regrets about 
the past, vain fears about the future and futile de- 
sires of unattainable objects, cull on your way all 
that which may procure you an accidental happiness, 
as amusements, travel, knowledge, arts, friendship, 
making others happy. Short is the time of your 
existence ; once gone you shall never return : be 
happy while you may. Happiness is within your 
reach, it is in your power — if you only look where 
it is — to possess it, and to possess it not to-morrow 
but to-day. Be not the man who " . . if 

never but always to be, blessed."* 

* Pope. 



36 



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